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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE-
NEW YORK RELEASE TIME PROGRAM
In 1940 the New York State legislature enacted a statute under which the
Commissioner of Education was authorized to establish rules and regulations to
permit the absence of school-children from the State's public schools for reli-
gious observances and education. N. Y. Education Law §3210 (1940). Pur-
suant to this enactment a "released time" program for religious instruction was
adopted in the City of New York to be held off the public school premises
with public school participation limited to releasing from secular instruction
for one hour a week those children willing to take religiods instruction. This
program was challenged by parents of two children attending public schools in the
City of New York as being an establishment of a religion prohibited by the First
Amendment to the Constitution which provides:
"Congress shall make no la*s respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
HELD, 6-1, that this is not an establishment of religion under the First Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment nor under Art. 1, Sec. 3 of the New York State Constitution. Zorach
v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Afd. 278 App. Div.
573, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 27 (2nd Dept. 1951); Aff'd. 303 N. Y. 161, 100 N. E. 2d
463 (1951).
In reaching its decision the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with
the decision of McCullom v. Board of Education 333 U. S. 203 (1948), the
Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the "Establishment Clause." It
found the facts of the Zorach case sufficiently dissimilar to be of constitutional
significance and applied its previous holding in People ex rel Lewis v. Graves
245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663 (1927); maintaining that it had not been overruled
by the McCullom case, supra. The Court was comforted by the results of Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of
Education 281 U. S. 370 (1930), and Bradfeld v. Roberts 175 U. S. 291 (1899),
citing them as instances of state action involving incidental benefits to religion that
were not objectionable.
The dictum of Justice Frankfurters concurring opinion in the McCullom
case, supra at 231 where he said:
"... Different forms which 'released time' has taken during more
than thirty years of growth include programs which, like that before us,
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could not withstand the test of the Constitution; "others may be found
unexceptionable.. :'
was relied upon as further justification for the present holding.
In McCullom v. Board of Education, supra, a released time program of
religious instruction in the public schools of Champaign, Illinois was involved.
The outstanding features and according to the New York Court in the principal
case, the grounds for distinction were that religious teachers, employed subject to
the approval and supervision of the school authorities by private religious groups,
gave religious instructions in public school buildings. The New York system has
avoided this in seeking to minimize public aid to the program by conducting it
outside of public buildings and by retaining no control over the religious teachers.
All that the school does besides excusing the pupil is to keep a record in order to
see that the excuses are not taken advantage of and the school deceived. The
element both systems have in common is that the public school system supplies
pupils to organized religious groups for purposes of religious instructions during
hours when the children, under the state's compulsory education laws, are required
to be in school. The controversy boils down to whether a program whereby
children are released 'on condition that they attend religious classes, is an estab-
lishment of a religion.
The First Amendment contains a dual prohibition; it bars not only laws
respecting an establishment of religion, but also laws prohibiting the free exercise
of religion. Previous cases involving freedom of religion have dealt with prohi-
bitions against the free exercise of religion. Case law has given these words
substantive meaning. Reynolds v. U. S. 98 U. S. 145 (1878), (polygamy out-
lawed); Pierce v.- Society of Sisters 268 U. S. 510 (1925), (parochial schools
upheld); Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U. S. 296 (1940), (licensing of religious
solicitors held invalid; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624 (1943), (compulsory flag salute in schools outlawed). These citations
are by no means exhaustive. Generally it can be deduced from these cases that
prohibitions as to the free exercise of religion will be held invalid unless the
religious practices sought to be prohibited are contrary to good health and morals.
The meaning of the establishment clause because of the comparative novelty
of the concept embodied therein is not dear. The cases dealing with it are replete
with citations to historical sources that purport to reveal the intent of the Consti-
tutional Fathers in including the phrase in its present wording in the First Amend-
ment. See generally McCullom v. Board of Education, supra at 212-232. Legal
writers have been active in this respect. Pfeffer, Religion, Education, And The
Constitution, 8 Lawyers Guild Review 387 (1948); Sutherland, Due Process And
Establishment, 62 Harvard Law Review 1306 (1949); O'Neill, Religion And
Education Under The Constitution (1949).
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Few occasions have arisen requiring judicial interpretation of the establish-
ment clause. Only four cases before 1947 have dealt with it, Watson v. Jones13 Wall. 679 (1872); Bradfield v. Roberts, supra; Quick Bear v. Leupp 210 U. S.50 (1908); and The Selective Draft Law Cases 245 U. S. 366 (1918), and theyhave not contributed materially to give the words substantive meaning. Indeed,
these cases are of such insignificance to the present problem that Justice Rutledge
disregarded their effect entirely in proclaiming in Everson v. Board of Education,
supra at 29, that the case forces the Court ". . . to determine squarely for the first
time what was 'an establishment of religion' in the First Amendment's concep-
tion . . .". Therefore the two authoritative pronouncements which will guide the
Court in the Zorach case are the Everson and McCullom decisions.
In the Everson case, supra the Court upheld the constitutionality of a NewJersey statute which provided for the expenditure of tax-raised funds to pay the bus
fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it paid
the fares of pupils attending public and other schools. The Court reasoned, atpage 16, that a state cannot exclude individual members of any faith ". .. because
of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legisla-
tion." The incidental benefits to a religious group did not invalidate a programdesigned to promote the welfare and safety of all schoolchildren. The holding of
this case would be of no avail in upholding the Zorach decision because the
Everson decision depends upon the existence of a state statute based upon a public
policy not designed primarily to aid religion. A statutory policy pronouncement
that a religious program is beneficial to the welfare and spiritual well-being of all
school children would come squarely within the constitutional ban.
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another, ... "
McCullom v. Board of Education, supra at 210; Everson v. Board of Education,
supra at 15.
It is submitted that the benefits to religion derived through a released time
program are not incidental to any valid public purpose and therefore could not bejustified by the results of cases holding incidental benefits to religion valid as in the
Cochran, Bradfield and Everson cases, supra.
The proponents of released time systems have not allowed to go unnoticed
certain practices in our national government which are examples of aid to religion.
Congressional Chaplains invoke a daily blessing, Rules of the House of Represon-
tatives, Rule VII (1943); Senate Manual 6 (1947). Chaplains are commissioned
officers, 3 Stat. 297 (1816). Religious services are conducted in the armed forces,
Army Reg. No. 60-5 (1944); U. S. Navy Reg., ch. 1, sect. 2, and ch. 34, sect. 1
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and 2 (1920). Compulsory attendance is required of cadets at church services on
Sunday at both military and naval academies, Reg. for the U. S. Corps of Cadets
47 (1947); U. S. Naval Academy Reg. Art. 4301 (b). The decisions, both state
and federal, dealing with the establishment problem invariably include such
examples as proof of the limited application of that part of the First Amendment.
The validity of these practices will not be before the Court when it decides
Zorach v. Clauson. While some can be justified as promoting the free exercise of
religion, others may be within the ban of Art. VI, sect. 3 of the Constitution which
provides:
"... But no religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any office or public trust under the United States."
Such examples lack persuasiveness since they are unchallenged and are not endowed
with a judicial blessing of constitutionality.
The New York Court largely distinguished the McCullom case on the fact
that the religious education there was given on the school premises: They held the
degree of aid insufficient to make the New York City program unconstitutional.
In so doing the Court has disregarded the last paragraph of the majority opinion of
Justice Black in the McCullom case at 212 where he said:
"Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings
used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The state also affords
sectarian groups a invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for
their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory school
machinery. This is not separation of Church and State."
Accordingly, as indicated by Justice Fuld dissenting in the Zorach case, the
second ground of the decision does not leave any ground for the operation of the
de minimis principle, therefore, to hold that whatever benefit to religion derived
from the New York City program is not a sufficient degree of aid to be judicially
noticeable, the Supreme Court must overrule the holding of the McCullom case.
The storm of controversy occasioned by the McCullom case has shown its
unpopularity among many persons even though that case reaffirmed a funda-
mental American principle which grew out of necessity arising from the multi-
plicity of sects in early America. Adherence to the establishment doctrine to the
point of overruling the New York City program may further disturb domestic
tranquillity, something which the.clause sought to prevent.
While this writer believes that legal analysis of the problem requires reversal
of Zorach v. Clauson, the path is technically open to the Supreme Court to affirm
if it feels that further extension of the constitutional doctrine of establishment will
no longer serve a useful purpose in a changing society.
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